Chapter 6: Labor Law: Municipal Bargaining by Segal, Robert M.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1971 Article 9
1-1-1971
Chapter 6: Labor Law: Municipal Bargaining
Robert M. Segal
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Segal, Robert M. (1971) "Chapter 6: Labor Law: Municipal Bargaining," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1971, Article 9.
CHAPTER 6 
Labor Law: Municipal Bargaining 
ROBERT M. SEGAL 
§6.1. Introduction. Twenty-five years ago a distinguished labor 
relations expert prophesied that the labor relations developments in 
private industry would someday be felt in the field of public employ-
ment.1 That day has now arrived. The 1960s have witnessed a tremen-
dous growth in employment, unionism, and labor strife in the public 
sector. From 1957 to 1967, public employers added 3.5 million persons 
to their payrolls, and public employment rose faster than employment 
in the private sector. 2 It is anticipated that by 1975 another 3.3 million 
persons will swell the number of government employees to a total of 
almost 15 million.3 In the ten years between 1960 and 1970, public 
employee union membership rose from slightly more than one million 
to more than three million, and in 1970 union members constituted 
almost 25 percent of the public sector work force. 4 Although generally 
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§6.1. 1 Beyer, Employee Relations in the Public Sector, 7 Pub. Personnel Rev. 20 
(1946). For a general discussion of developments in the public sector, see Bok and Dun-
lop, Labor and the American Community 312-341 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bok and 
Dunlop]; Twentieth Century Fund, Pickets at City Hall (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
Twentieth Century]; Industrial Relations Research Assn., Collective Bargaining in the 
Public Service (1966); Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for Bargaining in Local Govern-
ment Labor Relations, 30 Md. L. Rev. 179 (1970); Lev, Strikes by Government Employ-
ees: Problems and Solutions, 57 A.B.A.J. 771 (1971); Morris, Public Policy and the Law 
Relating to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 22 Sw. L.J. 585 (1969); Comment, 
Collective Bargaining for Public Employees: An Analysis of Statutory Provisions, 8 B.C. 
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 273 (1967). For an analysis of state laws covering teachers, see Wollett 
and Chanin, The Law and Practice of Teacher Negotiations (1970); Summary of State 
Collective Bargaining Statutes Affecting Teachers, Compact, spec. supp. Feb. 1971, table 
at 17-24. For discussions of labor relations in the public sector in Massachusetts, see 
Teele, Analysis of Massachusetts Municipal Law v. State Law and the NLRA (1970); 
Moran, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector-Massachusetts 5tyle, 52 Mass. L.Q. 
153 (1967); Mass. House Bill 5235 (1971) (Second Interim Report of the Special Legisla-
tive Study Commn. on Collective Bargaining) [hereinafter cited as House Bill5235]. The 
collective bargaining statutes of Massachusetts and regulations pertaining thereto are 
published in pamphlet form as Mass. Labor Relations Commn., Collective Bargaining 
Under the General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1970). 
2 BokandDunlop3l4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Twentieth Century I. 
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speaking it is illegal for public employees to engage in work stoppages, 5 
the growth in public employee labor strife, as measured by the increase 
in the number of work stoppages over the past ten years, has been ex-
ponential. In 1968 there were 254 walkouts involving over 200,000 
public employees, with over 2.5 million man-days idle. Ten years earlier 
there had been a nationwide total of only 15 strikes by 1720 state and 
local government employees, with 7510 man-days idle.6 Municipal 
workers now go on strike somewhere in the United States every three 
days. 7 
The causes of federal, state, and municipal employee unrest are 
several. First of all, increasingly younger and more militant employees 
have joined the public work force. Secondly, antiquated personnel 
practices and delays in handling grievances and negotiations have 
created employee frustration. Job hazards have increased, particularly 
for policemen, firemen, and teachers, and municipal employees have 
sought to exert their influence over conditions of employment to an 
extent never before attempted. In addition, the spirit of unrest, protest, 
and student activism reflected in the civil rights and antiwar move-
ments and the greater tolerance for protest and direct action against 
constituted authority have provided a hospitable climate for union-
ization and strikes by public employees. 
Economics has also had an important role in the labor strife of the 
public sector. The wages of many state and local employees have lagged 
5 On the federal level, government employees are specifically excluded from coverage 
under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq., which recognizes the 
right of employees in the private sector to strike. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 
(1966-1970), permits federal employees to organize unions and establish procedures 
which facilitate union recognition and negotiation between employees and the govern-
ment over "personnel policy" and working conditions to the extent such subjects are 
not covered by laws and regulations. For a discussion of Exec. Order No. 11,491, see 
Loewen berg, Developments of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program: Exec-
utive Order 10988 and Executive Order ll491; 21 Lab. L.J. 73-79 (1970). In Postal 
Clerks v. Blount, 404 U.S. 802 (1971), the Court affirmed without opinion a decision up-
holding the constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. §7311(3) and 18 U.S.C. §1918, which, in effect, 
ban strikes by federal employees. 
For a discussion of state labor relations, see McKelvey, The Role of State Agencies in 
Public Employee Labor Relations, 20 Ind. & Lab. Rei. Rev. 179 (1967). For a detailed 
summary of state labor laws, see Rubin, A Summary of State Collective Bargaining Law 
in Public Employment (Pub. Employee Relations Rep. No. 3, 1968); see also Executive 
Bd. of AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Dept., Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector 
(1969). In Jefferson County Teachers Assn. v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky's denial 
of the right to strike of public school teachers did not violate the state or federal consti-
tution. In Rogoff v. Anderson, 28 N.Y.2d 880, 271 N.E.2d 553, 322 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1971), 
dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 404 U.S. 805 (1971), the New York 
court upheld a statute requiring an organization of public employees seeking recogni-
tion as a bargaining agent to file an affirmation that it did not assert the right to strike. 
Some states do accord to public employees the right to strike. In both Hawaii (Laws 
1970, Act 171, §12 (4 BNA Lab. Rei. Rep. 21:232 to 21:233)) and Pennsylvania (Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 43, §§1101.1001 to 1101.1010 (Supp. 1971)) public employees have a limited 
right to strike after they have exhausted certain prescribed procedures. 
6 Twentieth Century 32. 
7 Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 19, 1971, at I. 
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far behind wages in private employment, and the inflationary pres-
sures of the sixties have stimulated large wage and benefit demands 
which have fostered more than 50 percent of all public sector labor 
disputes in recent years.8 Public employee demands for wage parity 
with the private employee must compete with the need for larger public 
outlays for construction, welfare, and expanded and new services, and 
these wage demands come at a time of manifest taxpayer dissatisfaction 
with rising taxes and inadequate government services.9 As a conse-
quence, resistance to the wage demands runs nigh on the part of both 
governmental employers and taxpayers. It has not helped that many 
states have only begrudgingly accepted the existence of public employ-
ee unions. 10 Although the right of employees to organize is recognized 
in the great majority of states, there is much less acceptance on the 
part of public authorities of the need to negotiate with public employee 
unions. Indeed, several states have enacted legislation prohibiting 
collective bargaining with public employees.I 1 Only a few states 
have established procedures to determine an appropriate bargaining 
unit, to test the strength of employee support for a given union, to as-
certain the proper subjects of collective bargaining, or to resolve dis-
putes over the rules and procedures of collective bargaining. 12 
8 Twentieth Century 33. 
9 Since wages and salaries make up almost half of state and local government expendi-
tures and 15 percent of federal expenditures, a 5 percent wage and salary increase to all 
government employees would cost taxpayers $4 to $5 billion, exclusive of related fringe 
benefits. Bok and Dunlop 314. 
10 The failure of public employers to recognize or negotiate with public employee 
unions was the major cause of approximately one-quarter of the public sector strikes be-
tween 1962 and 1968. Twentieth Century 33. 
11 Texas has enacted legislation declaring collective bargaining with public employ-
ees to be against public policy (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 5154c (1971)); North Carolina 
has prohibited organization on the part of public employees (N.C. Gen. Stat. §95-97 
(1965)), although the statute has been declared unconstitutional on its face (Atkins v. 
City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969)); and Alabama prohibits state 
employees from joining unions (Ala. Code tit. 55, §§317(1)-317(4) (1960)). However, in 
AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969), it was held that public employees 
have a right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to belong to unions. 
12 Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§7-467 to 7-477 (Supp. 1972)), Hawaii (Laws 
1970, Act 171 (4 BNA Lab. Rei. Rep.21:224 to 21:234)), Massachusetts (G.L., c. 149, 
§§178D-178N (Supp. 1970), Michigan (Mich. Stat. Ann. §§17.455(1) to 17.455(16) (1968)), 
New York (N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§200-208 (McKinney Supp. 1971)), Pennsylvania (Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§217.1 to 217.10 (Supp. 1971) (policemen and firemen only)), Rhode 
Island (R.I. Gen. Laws §§28-9.4-1 to 28-9.4-19 (1969)), and Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§III. 70 (Supp. 1972)) have adopted comprehensive statutory schemes regulating public 
employee labOr relations. Other states have adopted specific statutes to regulate particu-
lar employees, primarily teachers. See Summary of State Collective Bargaining Statutes 
Affecting Teachers, Compact, spec. supp. Feb. 1971, table at 17-24. 
Absent specific statutory authorization. to bargain collectively with their employees, 
governmental units have been forced to seek authorization to do so under common law. 
Courts have divided on the question. In Florida (Dade County v. Amalgamated Assn. of 
Street, Elec. Ry. & Water Work Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. App. 1963), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 971 (1965)), and in California (Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 
292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946)), the courts have not granted governmental units the authority 
to bargain collectively without specific authorization, on the theory that collective bar-
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Public employment in Massachusetts has reflected the nationwide 
trends. The number of public employees rose sharply in the past de-
cade: state employment increased from 40,352 in 1959 to the present 
55,000; city, county, and town employment soared from 138,000 to the 
present estimated 220,000. 13 One-fifth of the total work force in Mas-
sachusetts now earns its living by public employment.14 Public em-
ployee unionism has also greatly increased: in the three-year period 
from 1969 through 1971 the number of local unions representing public 
employees rose by 50 percent (from 376 to 560), and total membership 
increased by nearly 40 percent (from 78,694 to 108,349).15 As of 1971, 
the number of unionized employees in municipal and state service 
constituted 18 percent of the total organized labor force in Massachu-
setts,16 an increase of 360 percent in seven years. Prior to tlie effective 
date of the Massachusetts collective bargaining law in 1966, there were 
no written labor contracts for school teachers, and the Massachusetts 
Teachers Association (MTA) had only 30,000 members. Today, in 
nearly every one of the state's 351 cities and towns, education personnel 
are represented by locals of the Massachusetts Federation of Teachers, 
AFL-CIO, or by the MT A, which itself claimed 43,000 members as of 
1969,17 As of February 1971, 42,000 of the state's 55,000 employees 
were members of bargaining units. 18 r 
Concerted activities on the part of Massachusetts public employees 
have increased as well, both in number and variety. There have been 
strikes by teachers in Boston, New Bedford, and Fall River; mass refusals 
to work overtime by municipal employees in Worcester; "blue days" 
by patrolmen; demonstrations by firemen and policemen; and mass 
resignations of nurses and threats of resignation by doctors at the Bos-
ton City Hospital. In Massachusetts, as in other urban states, the time 
of the public employee has come. 
As state and national statistics indicate, public employment is becom-
ing an increasingly important segment of the labor market. More stress 
is being placed on the laws by which labor conflicts in the public sector 
must be resolved. The growing significance of public employee labor 
gaining illegally narrows the sovereignty of the governmental units involved. In other 
states, however, the authority has been granted, e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board 
of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951) (school board could bargain with teachers' 
union over wages and working conditions, provided that the resulting contract covered 
only union members and did not limit the statutory power of the Board of Estimates to 
fix the maximum aggregate amount of teacher salaries). 
15 House Bill5235, at 15. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Mass. Dept. of Labor and Industries, Directory of Labor Unions 189-190 (1971). 
It is interesting to note that the greatest increase in union membership occurred in the 
ranks of female employees in the public sector, whose number increased from 28,333 to 
45,150 during the years 1969-1971. The number of male employees rose from 50,361 to 
63,199 during the same period. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Boston Globe, Dec. 2, 1969, at IO,col. I. 
1s House Bill5235, at 15. 
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relations presents a new challenge to the law of collective bargaining, 
one which must be met if mature and harmonious labor relations in the 
public sector are to be achieved. 
§6.2. Introduction to Massachusetts municipal labor relations legis-
lation. Prior to 1943, public employees in Massachusetts had only a 
limited right to organize. 1 In 1943, the commissioner of administration 
and finance issued a directive declaring that state employees could 
organize and be represented by their own chosen representatives,2 but 
the status of employees of political subdivisions was unaffected by the 
directive. Not until 1958 did the legislature grant to all public employ-
ees-except police officers-the right to join unions and to present 
proposals with respect to salaries and other conditions of employment 
through their own representatives. 3 During the years 1958 to 1965, 
public employees formed unions, met with various governmental offi-
cials, and filed legislation concerning public employment, but they 
remained dependent on legislation for increases in wages and benefits. 4 
It was not until 1965 that a comprehensive labor relations law was 
-enacted for public employees.5 By Chapter 763 of the Acts of 1965, the 
legislature provided a comprehensive mandatory collective bargaining 
law for municipal employees throughout the Commonwealth.6 Al-
though the municipal bargaining statutes have been amended several 
times, their basic provisions remain intact. 
Chapter 763 of the Acts of 1965 inserted Sections l78G to 178N in 
Chapter 149 of the General Laws. In Section 178G, the terms municipal 
§6.2. 1 G.L., c. 149, §20 was the only source of any right to organize: "No person 
shall, himself or by his agent, coerce or compel a person into a written or oral agreement 
not to join or become a member of a labor organization as a condition of his securing em· 
ployment or continuing in the employment of such person." 
2 Doyle, Labor Perspectives on the Civil Service: The Roles of Unionism, Tufts As· 
sembly on Mass. Government I (1966). 
3 Acts of 1958, c. 460, added G.L., c. 149, § 178D, which grants public employees the 
right to join unions and also prohibits discrimination against, or the discharge of, those 
employees because of their union activities. The intimidation or coercion of public em· 
ployees in carrying out their union activities is also prohibited. By Chapter 156 of the 
Acts of 1966, police officers were given the rights granted to other municipal employees 
by the municipal bargaining statutes. 
4 E.g., Acts of 1957, c. 447 (raising the minimum wage for teachers to $3300); Acts of 
1963, c. 412 (permitting a town to grant any of its employees a leave of absence with pay 
to attend a veterans' convention); Acts of 1964, c. 637 (recognizing the right of employees 
of the Commonwealth to organize). 
5 Prior to 1965, the activities of municipal employees and their unions were controlled 
by common law, which prohib.ited strikes, offered no machinery for union recognition or 
collective bargaining, and did not recognize any substantive right on the part of munici-
pal employees to join a union and to be free from interference and coercion in their ac-
tivities. The state anti-injunction law (G.L., c. 214, §9A) and the state labor relations 
laws (G.L., c. 150A) did not apply to public employees, and, as a result, injunctions 
against employee activities could more easily be obtained in the public sector. E.g., Han-
sen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 181 N.E.2d 843 (1962) (transit authority held to 
be body politic incorporate and political subdivision of" the Commonwealth; there-
fore, authority employees were public employees and were not covered by anti-
injunction labor statute). 
6 State employees are covered by G.L., c. 149, §178F. 
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employer, employees, employee organization, and professional employ-
ee are defined. Section l78H sets forth the rights of employees and the 
duty of the bargaining representative, the procedure for determining 
which employee organization is to be the bargaining representative, 
guidelines for determining the appropriate bargaining unit, and author-
ity for the use of consent elections. Section 178I imposes the duty to 
bargain collectively and details the requirements as to who may repre-
sent the employer in bargaining sessions. In Section 178} the procedure 
for the resolution of an impasse in negotiations is set out, and under 
Section l78K certain services of the Massachusetts Board of Concilia-
tion and Arbitration are made available to employers and employee 
organizations. Section 178L prohibits specified activities of employee 
organizations and municipal employers and creates a procedure where-
by complaints with respect to prohibited activities are evaluated and 
appropriate remedies dispensed. Section 178M outlaws strikes by public 
employees. The final provision in the 1965 enactment, Section l78N, 
notes certain jurisdictional limitations and declares that no provision 
of the act shall in any way imply a right to strike. 
The administration of the municipal bargaining statute is entrusted 
primarily to the Masschusetts Labor Relations Commission, which is 
composed of three members, each appointed by the governor for a five-
year term.7 The commission is granted the authority to make, amend, 
and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to imple-
ment the mandate of its own enabling act,8 the provisions of G.L., c. 
149, §§178H and l78L, and the provisions of G.L., c. l50A, which deal 
with labor relations in the private sector.9 On June l, 1970, five years 
after the passage of Chapter 763 of the Acts of 1965, and pursuant to 
the authority granted therein, the commission issued rules and regula-
tions with respect to Chapter 149. 10 
The Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and Arbibration also plays 
an important role in the settlement of labor disputes. The board is ad-
ministered in accordance with Chapter 150 of the General Laws and 
provides its services to both public and private employers. It is em-
powered to conciliate, arbitrate, and appoint fact finders in its efforts 
to resolve labor disputes. 11 The current fact-finding rules of the board 
with respect to public employers were issued in 1971 pursuant to the 
board's authority under Chapter 149, Section l78J(c); 12 the board 
7 G.L., c. 23, §90. 
8 The commission's enabling act is G.L., c. 23, §§90-9R. 
9 Id.§9R. 
10 Mass. Labor Relations Commn., Rules and Regulations Relating to the Admininis-
tration of an Act Providing for the Election of Representative Bargaining Agents with 
Political Subdivisions of the Commonwealth (effective June I, 1970), as published in 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Collective Bargaining under the General Laws of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 36-45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rules and Regula-
tions]. . 
II G.L.,c.l49,§§178J,l78K. 
12 Mass. Bd. of Conciliation and Arbitration, Fact Finding Rules (April 16, 1971) 
(available from the board) [hereinafter cited as Fact Finding Rules]. 
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also has issued regulations governing the arbitration procedure. 13 
§6.3. Representation of municipal employees. All employees 1 of 
municipal employers are granted the right of self-organization, the 
right to form, join, or assist any employee organization, and the right 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
free from actual interference, restraint, or coercion. 2 This right, how-
ever, is subject to two provisos, namely: that the employee organiza-
tion recognized by a municipal employer or designated as the repre-
sentative of the majority of the employees represent an "appropriate 
unit,'' 3 and that the employee organization, as exclusive bargaining 
agent for all employees in that unit, represent the interests of all such 
employees without discrimination and without regard to membership 
in the organization. 4 
An employee organization can be certified by the commission as the 
bargaining representative 5 of an appropriate unit of employees by 
going through the statutory procedures of petition, hearing, election. 6 
There are several ways in which the commission may be petitioned 
relative to certification of an employee organization: (I) by a municipal 
employer alleging that one or more employee organizations have pre-
sented a claim to be recognized as the representative of a majority of 
employees in a specified unit;7 or (2) by an employee, group of em-
ployees, or an employee organization alleging that a substantial num-
ber of employees wish to be represented for collective bargaining by 
13 Mass. Bd. of Conciliation and Arbitration, Rules and Regulations (undated) (avail-
able from the board). 
§6.3. 1 As defined in G.L., c. 149, §178G, employee does not include an elected offi-
cial, a board or commission member, or an executive officer of ariy municipal employer. 
Municipal employer is defined as "any county, city, town, or district, and any person 
designated by the municipal employer to act in its interest in dealing with municipal 
employees." Ibid. 
2 G.L., c. 149, §178H(I). The statute apparently draws a distinction between freedom 
from interference, restraint, or coercion, which is protected by Sl'ction 178L, and freedom 
from actual interference, restraint, or coercion, which is protected by Section 178H. The 
distinction has not yet been litigated, nor has the commission issued explanatory regula-
tions. 
Section 178G defines employee organization as "any lawful association, organization, 
federation or council having as a primary purpose the improvement of wages, hours and 
other conditions of employment." 
3 G.L., c. 149, §178H(I). The determination of appropriateness is within the discretion 
of the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission. Id. §178H(4). 
4 I d.§ 178H(I ). 
5 An employer always has the option, if so requested by an employee organization, of 
recognizing the organization as the employees' bargaining representative without any 
formal procedural steps being taken. See id. §§ 178H, 1781. Having been recognized by 
the employer, the employee organization is bound by G.L., c. 149, §§178H, 178I, and 
178L to represent the employees in the unit and to bargain collectively just as though 
the organization had been certified by the commission. Ibid. The advantage gained by 
certification is security: only if the organization is certified after an election can it be 
secure for one year from decertification by another election. Id. §178H(3). 
6 G.L., c.l49, §§178H(2), 178H(3). 
7 G.L., c. 149, §178H(2). The other necessary contents of petitions brought by employ-
ers are prescribed in Rules and Regulations art. II, §2A. 
7
Segal: Chapter 6: Labor Law: Municipal Bargaining
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
102 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §6.3 
an employee organization as exclusive representative;8 or (3) by an 
employer, employee or group of employees, or an employee organiza-
tion alleging that the employee organization currently certified or 
recognized by the municipal employer as the bargaining representative 
does not currently represent a majority of the employees in the unit.9 
Absent uncommon or extenuating circumstances, the petitions of an 
employee, group of employees, or an employee organization must be 
signed by at least 30 percent of the employees in the unit that the or-
ganization seeks to represent. 10 The commission must verify the signa-
tures supporting these petitions if, within ten days of the filing of the 
petition, 5 percent of the employees in the unit request such verifica-
tion.u 
If, after investigating the petition, the commission finds reasonable 
cause to believe that a question of representation exists, it must hold a 
hearing. 12 At this time the employer and the employees or the employ-
ee organization may waive the hearing and agree to the commission's 
conducting a consent election. 13 Absent such a consent election agree-
ment, a formal, public hearing is held following notice to all inter-
ested parties, 14 at which hearing all interested parties may be repre-
sented by counsel.J5 After the hearing, the commission may either 
certify the bargaining representative16 or, if a question of representa-
tion remains, direct an election by secret ballot or other suitable means 
to resolve the issue. 17 The statute specifically rules out elections in 
two instances: (I) within the 12 months following a valid election in 
the same unit; and (2) during the term of a collective bargaining agree-
ment to which the unit is subject (except for good cause). 18 The com-
mission has the discretion to control the terms and manner of conduct-
ing the election, and must specify them when it directs the holding of 
an election. 19 The employee organization that receives the majority of 
the votes cast in an election will be designated by the commission as the 
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the unit. 20 In 
8 G.L., c. 149, §178H(2). The other necessary contents of petitions filed by these par-
ties are prescribed in Rules and Regulations art. II, §2. 
9 G.L., c. 149, §178H(2). The necessary contents of decertification petitions are pre-
scribed in Rules and Regulations art. II, §2B. 
10 Rules and Regulations art. II, §1. The phrase uncommon and extenuating circum-
stances is not defined or further described in Rules and Regulations. 
II G.L., c. 149, §178H(2). 
12 Ibid. 
13 G.L., c. 149, §178H(5). Rules and Regulations art. II, §10, sets forth the consent 
election agreement. 
14 G.L., c. 149, §178H(2); Rules and Regulations art. II, §§3, 5. 
15 Rules and Regulations art. II, §6; the hearing procedure is set forth in Rules and 
Regulations art. II, §§4-7. 
I6 Rules and Regulations art. II, §8. 
17 G.L., c. 149, §178H(3). There is no elaboration of the meaning of other suitable 
method in the statute or in Rules and Regulations. 
18 Ibid. Good cause is not defined or described in the statute or in Rules and Regula-
tions. 
I9 Rules and Regulations art. II, §9. 
2oG.L.,c.l49,§178H(3). 
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an election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, 
a runoff election between the top two choices is held,21 the winner 
being certified. Elections may be set aside by the commission based on 
objections made to and filed with the commission within five days of 
the election. 22 
The determination of the appropriate bargaining unit is left to the 
discretion of the commission, 23 with two caveats: ( l) uniformed em-
ployees of the fire department are to be in separate units;24 and (2) no 
unit shall include both professional and nonprofessional employees 
unless a majority of the professional employees vote for inclusion in 
the larger unit. 25 The regulations issued by the commission do not 
shed light upon any other standards that the commission may utilize. 
General Laws, c. 149, §l78H(4), which deals with the determination of 
appropriate bargaining units, should be compared with the similar 
statutory provision applicable to private employment26 and with the 
statute that regulates collective bargaining for state employees.27 
The extent of the commission's discretion in determining the appro-
priate bargaining unit, the general standards to be considered in mak-
ing such a determination, and the method of reviewing the commission's 
determination were discussed by the Supreme Judicial Court in City 
Manager of Medford v. State Labor Relations Commission.28 The 
commission had determined that the appropriate bargaining unit was 
to consist of all uniformed firefighters other than the chief. An order 
was then issued that an election be held for the employees in the unit 
to ascertain whether the firefighters in fact desired to be represented by 
the union. The city manager argued that the commission's unit was 
inappropriate because all uniformed supervisory employees with the 
exception of the chief were put in the same unit with uniformed non-
supervisory employees. The Court replied: 
[Section 178H(4)] does not indicate to us that all uniformed fire-
fighters must be in the same unit. We think that the section re-
21 Ibid. 
22 Rules and Regulations art. II, §9. 
23 G.L., c. 149, §178H(4). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. G.L., c. 149, §178G, defines a professional employee as "any employee en-
gaged in work which is predominantly intellectual and varied in character ... which 
involves the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance . . . and 
which requires knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning cus-
tomarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and 
study .... " 
26 The statute applicable to private employment is G.L., c. 150A, §5(b). 
27 The statute applicable to state employees is G.L., c. 149, §178F(3), which provides 
in part: "Employee organizations and the appropriate department may establish appro-
priate collective bargaining units based upon community of interest, which may include 
similar working conditions, common supervision and physical location. Employees 
may, in appropriate cases, be given the opportunity to determine for themselves whether 
they desire to establish themselves as an appropriate collective bargaining unit." 
28 353 Mass. 519, 233 N.E.2d 310 (1968) (appeal from the commission's determination 
and order of election dismissed as premature). 
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quires no more than that uniformed employees be kept in one or 
more units separate from the department's non-uniformed em-
ployees, thus enabling the commission to deal flexibly in the 
public interest with the great variety of situations that may con-
front it. These may require determining whether in any particu-
lar community or department it is wise to include supervisory 
employees in a unit with the employees whom they supervise.29 
Noting that Section 178H contained no provision excluding from the 
definition of employee an "individual employed as a supervisor," the 
Court stated that the commission was not bound by federal precedents 
to the effect that supervisors could not be included in the unit.30 
The Court declared that the commission, in determining the appro-
priatness of a bargaining unit, must consider the public interest objec-
tives of the statute. "Because the statute deals with public employees, 
public interest considerations are of greater importance in determin-
ing appropriate units than in cases dealing with private employment. " 31 
The Court pointed out that in addition the commission may take 
into account considerations such as those discussed in jordan Marsh 
Co. v. Labor Relations Commission. 32 Although jordan Marsh in-
volved the private sector, the Court indicated that the considerations 
discussed in that case could be relevant to questions involving the 
public sector. In jordan Marsh the Supreme Judicial Court stated the 
bargaining units should be adapted, as far as possible, to the manner 
in which the particular industry is "habitually" run; that the bargain-
ing units should include the largest possible number of employees 
with "common interests in the more important matters which are likely 
to become the subjects of collective bargaining"; and that the commis-
sion must avoid "Balkanization" and at the same time insure that the 
bargaining units are small enough to provide adequate representation 
for the individual employees.33 
The Court in Medford also discussed whether the commission's 
determination and order of election constituted a final order that was 
subject to judicial review. The Court concluded that, absent extraordin-
ary circumstances making certification questions of vital significance 
or absent questions relating to the commission's jurisdiction, 
judicial review of certification questions (ought to be postponed) 
until, upon complaint, the commission has issued or denied an 
order (see c. 149, § 178L) to the municipal employer or to em-
ployees to desist from a practice prohibited by the statute. When 
such an order is issued, the propriety of the commission's decision 
29 Id. at 525, 233 N.E.2d at 315. Accord: Worcester Indus. Tech. Inst. Instructors Assn. 
v. Labor Relations Commn., 357 Mass. 118, 256 N.E.2d 287 (1970) (petition for review of 
commission's order for an election held premature). 
30 353 Mass. 519, 526n.7, 233 N.E.2d310, 315 n.7 (1968). 
31 Id. at525, 233 N.E.2dat 314-315. 
32 316 Mass. 748, 56N.E.2d 915 (1944). 
33 Id. at 751, 56N.E.2dat 917. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 9
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/9
§6.4 LABOR LAW: MUNICIPAL BARGAINING 105 
on certification issues will be open for appropriate judicial scru-
tiny. 34 
§6.4. Prohibited practices. Certain activities of municipal em-
ployers, their representatives, or agents are prohibited: 
(1) interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [l78H]; (2) dominating 
or interfering with the formation, existence or administration of 
any employee organization; (3) discharging or otherwise dis-
criminating against an employee because he has signed or filed 
any affidavit, petition or complaint or given any information or 
testimony under this section; (4) refusing to bargain collectively 
in good faith with an employee organization which has been 
recognized or designated as the exclusive representative of em-
ployees in an appropriate unit; [and] (5) refusing to discuss griev-
ances with the representatives of an employee organization re-
cognized or designated as the exclusive representative in an appro-
. . I pnate unit .... 
Also prohibited are certain acts of employee organizations or their 
agents, namely, 
(l) restraining or coercing a municipal employer in the selection 
of its representative for purposes of collective bargaining or the 
adjustment of grievances; and (2) if recognized or designated as 
the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit, 
refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with a municipal 
employer.2 
Complaints of past or present prohibited practices may be made to 
the commission by any municipal employer or employee organization. 3 
The complaint must be embodied in a written and signed charge.4 As 
well as identifying the parties concerned with the complaint, the charge 
must enumerate the provisions of G.L., c. 149, §l78L which have been 
or are being violated, and must contain a concise statement of facts 
supporting the claim of a violation.5 After a charge has been filed, the 
commission must conduct an investigation to determine whether fur-
ther proceedings are necessary. 6 If the investigation indicates that no 
further proceedings are necessary, the commission may enter an order 
dismissing the complaint; if further actions appear to be called for, the 
commission may order additional investigation or a hearing.7 If a 
34 353 Mass. 519, 523, 233 N .E.2d 310, 314 (1968). 
§6.4. I G.L.,c.l49,§178L. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Rules and Regulations art. III,§ I. 
4 Id. §2. 
5 Id. §3. This requirement, if narrowly enforced, might be quite a stumbling block for 
an employee who is trying to file a charge on his own. 
6 Id. §4. 
7 G.L.,c.I49,§178L. 
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proceeding is to be instituted, the commission is required to issue and 
cause to be served upon the party charged with the prohibited practice 
a formal complaint stating the charges and giving notice of a hearing 
to be held before the commission. A similar notice and a copy of the 
complaint are to be delivered to the complainant.8 Any complaint 
may be amended at the discretion of the commission,9 and any com-
plaint may be in whole or in part withdrawn by the commission on its 
own motion after notice has been given to the parties, or upon the 
motion of the commission's attorney. 10 
The party served with the commission's complaint has the right to 
file an answer to the original or amended complaint within five days 
of such service or within such time as the commission in its discretion 
may allow.n The answer must either deny separately, clearly, and 
precisely those asserted facts that are alleged in each paragraph of the 
complaint and that the charged party intends to deny, or must express 
the lack of knowledge of the charged party with respect to the alleged 
facts. 12 Should the charged party answer and refrain from contesting 
the proceeding, or consent to the entry of a cease and desist order, or 
admit the allegations in the complaint, he will be deemed to have 
waived a hearing. He will also be deemed to have authorized the com-
mission to enter an order that the charged party cease and desist the 
admitted violations or to take any other proper action, including the 
ordering of a fact-finding.I3 
The charged party has the right to appear before the commission, 
personally or otherwise, to defend himsel£. 14 Any other person, at the 
discretion of the commission, may intervene in the proceeding. 15 If 
the commission determines after a hearing that a prohibited practice 
has not been or is not being committed, it will state its finding of fact 
and order the dismissal of the complaint. 16 If the commission deter-
mines that a prohibited practice has been committed, the commission 
will state its findings of fact and enter an order that the charged party 
cease and desist from the prohibited practiceY The commission has 
been directed to take further affirmative action as follows: (I) if an em-
ployee organization has either been established or been assisted in its es-
8 Rules and Regulations art. III, §4. 
9 G.L., c.l49, §178L. 
10 Rules and Regulations art. III, §7, states in part: "Any such complaint ... may be 
withdrawn by the Commission on its own motion, upon notice to all parties or on mo-
tion of the Commission's attorney .... " The regulation apparently does not require 
that notice be given to the parties when a complaint is withdrawn upon the motion of 
the commission's attorney. -
11 G.L.,c.I49,§178L. 
12 Rules and Regulations art. III, §9, states in part: "The answer shall deny in clear 
and precise terms every alleged substantive fact intended to be denied in each paragraph 
of the complaint separately. " 
u ld. §12. 
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tablishment by the prohibited practice, the commission is to withdraw 
its certification of the organization; and (2) if an employee was dis-
charged or discriminated against in violation of the first paragraph of 
Section I78L (the employer prohibited practices paragraph), the com-
mission is to order his reinstatement, with or without back pay. 18 If 
it is even alleged to the commission, either in conjunction with another 
charge or independently, that either the employee organization or the 
employer has refused to bargain collectively, the commissiOn is to 
order fact-finding and direct the party at fault to bear the full cost 
thereo£. 19 
Although it is the duty of the employee organization under Section 
l78H to represent all employees without discrimination and without 
regard to employee organization membership, there is no provision in 
the statute or in the commission's regulations providing a remedy for 
the employee who has been discriminated against by his own employee 
organization. 
§6.5. Concerted activities of municipal employees. Municipal em-
ployees have the right to engage in concerted activities, either in aid 
of collective bargaining or for other mutual aid or protection, free from 
actual interference, restraint, or coercion. 1 These employees are ex-
plicitly and implicitly prohibited, however, from inducing, encourag-
ing, or engaging in any strike, work stoppage, slowdown, or with-
holding of services by municipal employees.2 No penalty is prescribed 
for violation of the no-strike statute; the normal procedure for enforc-
ing the law is through the use of an injunction. Once an injunction 
against the concerted activity has been obtained, violation of the in-
junction is punishable under the contempt powers of the court sitting 
in equity. 3 Thus, apart from the right to strike, municipal employees 
have the right to engage in the full range of concerted activities per-
mitted to their brethren in the private sector, including, for example, 
advertising, lobbying for legislative action, leafleting, and peaceful 
picketing. 
§6.6. Collective bargaining. Both the municipal employer and 
the duly designated representative of an appropriate bargaining unit 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. It appears from Section 178L that the order for a fact-finding is mandatory. 
and that the hearing procedure required for other prohibited practices is not required 
where the charge alleges a refusal to bargain. In practice. however, a hearing is held on 
all charges. 
§6.5. I G.L., c.l49, §178H(l). 
2 Id. §§178M, 178N. The latter section declares that nothing in the municipal bar-
gaining statute (G.L., c. 149, §§178F-178M) shall constitute a grant of the right to strike 
to employees of any municipal employer. 
3 E.g., School Comm. of New Bedford v. Dlouhy, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1257, 271 N.E. 
2d 655 (defendant teachers fined .$50,000 for civil contempt after violating no-strike in-
junction). Criminal contempt procedures have also been used by courts to enforce no-
strike injunctions. E.g., School Comm. of Boston v. Reilly, Eq. No. 91352 (Suffolk Super. 
Ct., May 6, 1970) (teachers' union leader sentenced to 30 days in jail for violation of no-
strike injunction). 
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of employees have a duty to bargain collectively, that is, the duty to 
meet at reasonable times (including meetings appropriately related 
to the budget-making process) and to confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, or with respect 
to the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder. 1 
Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith is a practice prohibited 
by G.L., c. 149, §l78L, whether engaged in by an employer or an em-
ployee organization. The parties are under a duty to execute a written 
contract that incorporates any agreements they may reach, 2 but neither 
party is required to agree to any proposal of the other or to make any 
concession to the other. 3 
In bargaining with organizations representing other than school 
employees, the chief executive officer of the municipality or his des-
ignee will represent the municipal employer. 4 In bargaining with 
school employees, the school committee or its designee will represent 
the municipal employer. Where the school committees of various juris-
dictions have joined together in a superintendency union formed in 
accordance with general or special law,5 the committees involved may 
be represented by common representatives designated by the committees, 
and the employee organizations may be similarly represented.6 
In the public sector, the subjects of collective bargaining, i.e., wages, 
hours, and conditions of employment, may in some ways be restricted 
or defined by statute. The use of checkoffs7 and agency fees8 is so de-
fined. The statute provides that the checkoff of union dues by a public 
employer may be authorized by the particular state, county, city, or 
town employer concerned,9 or by the local or regional school commit-
§6.6. 1 G.L., c. 149, §1781. The terms good faith and conditions of employment are 
not defined with reference to collective bargaining by municipal employees. Conditions 
of employment is defined with respect to collective bargaining by state employees as 
"any conditions of employment not in conflict with statutes of the Commonwealth or 
rules and regulations made pursuant thereto." Mass. Labor Relations Commn., Rules 
and Regulations on Collective Bargaining Under 178 D Pc E, Rule 1.7. The definition 





5 A superintendency union is an association of two or more towns for the purpose of 
employing a common superintendent of their collective school systems. G.L., c. 71, §61 
prescribes the conditions regarding the number of schools and the limitations as to the 
particular towns in which a union may be formed. 
6 G.L.,c.l49,§1781. 
7 A checkoff is a deduction from the pay of a union employee of certain sums which 
may constitute union dues. The employer makes the deduction and pays the money to 
the employee organization. 
8 An agency fee is a deduction from the pay of a nonunion employee of certain sums 
that represent the employee's fair share of the cost of the union's representation of his 
interests. The employer makes the deduction and pays the money directly to the union. 
9 G.L., c. 180, §17A. This statute was enacted in 1950 and has been amended several 
times. The provision is ambiguous insofar as it refers to "union dues to an association 
of state, county or municipal employees." 
The statute does not require that the collective bargaining agreement-if there is 
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tee where a teachers' union is involved. 10 The state, county, or muni-
cipal treasurer may withhold the union dues of any employee who 
submits written authorization for such withholding, but the employee 
may withdraw such authorization by giving 60 days' written notice to 
the employer and the union involved.ll A bond is required of the 
treasurer of the union or association for which dues are being with-
held.12 A teacher may authorize the withholding from his or her 
salary of an amount specified in writing for payment of dues to an 
association of teachers, and may withdraw the authorization after giv-
ing 60 days' notice. 13 A bond is also required from the treasurer of the 
teachers' association. 14 General Laws, c. 180, §17G governs agency 
fees from county and municipal employees, which must be propor-
tionately commensurate with the cost of collective bargaining and con-
tract administration. The fees can be deducted from an employee's pay 
check and transmitted to the union which has been designated the ex-
clusive bargaining representative under municipal bargaining law, 
and that union's treasurer must post a bond. These deductions must 
be based on written authorizations from the employee and can be with-
drawn on 60 days' written notice to the municipal employer and the 
union. Presumably, although the statute does not so specify, the re-
quirement for agency fees would have to be included in the collective 
bargaining agreement between th{' parties, arid the amount would have 
to be agreed upon by the parties. 
In 1969, the city of Boston and Suffolk County were authorized to 
make payroll deductions for agency fees payable to exclusive bargain-
ing representatives under the following conditions: 
(l) if the collective bargaining agreement contains an agency 
fee clause; and (2) the sum proportionately commensurate with 
the cost of collective bargaining and contract administration is 
stated in the agreement; and (3) the agreement with the agency 
fee clause is formally executed pursuant to a vote of a majority 
of the employees in the bargaining unit. 15 
The range of subjects open to municipal collective bargaining may 
possibly be restricted by implication under Section 178N, which pro-
vides that the municipal bargaining statutes may not diminish the 
power or authority of the Civil Service Commission or any lawfully 
constituted retirement or personnel board. It can be argued that Sec-
one-provide for the checkoff. Acts of 1969, c. 472, provides that where a union is rec-
ognized or certified, the dues can only be checked off for the union which is the exclu-
sive bargaining agent; if no union is certified or recognized, the statute seems to place no 
limit on the number of unions for which checkoffs can be authorized. 
w G.L., c. 180, §17C. 
II Id.§I7A. 
12 Ibid. 
13 G.L., c. 180, §I 7C. Section I 7E allows a checkoff for dues paid to a teachers' asso-
ciation by a school nurse. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Acts of I 969, c. 335 (a special act). 
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tion l78N prevents a municipal employer from bargaining about tenure 
or from laying off employees in a manner other than as directed by the 
Civil Service Commission. Section 178N may also prevent the munici-
pal employer from discharging an employee, even if the discharge is 
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or is otherwise called 
for to resolve a grievance. 
§6.7. Aids to collective bargaining: Fact-finding; Conciliation; 
Mediation. Collective bargaining in the public sector is most often 
employed to hammer out a new collective bargaining agreement (em-
ployment contract) between the municipal employer and the employee 
organization. Often the employee organization, lacking any real power 
at the bargaining table because it cannot legally call its members out 
on strike, is not able to achieve what it considers acceptable terms for 
the new contract and will thus refuse to agree to the terms proposed. If 
both parties are adamant in their positions and a solution cannot be 
reached over the bargaining table (before or after the employees have 
engaged in concerted activities), certain statutory aids to collective 
bargaining are available. 1 
If after a reasonable period of negotiation a dispute exists between 
an employee organization and a municipal employer over the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement, or if no agreement has been 
reached by the parties 60 days prior to the final date for setting the 
municipal budget, either party or both parties acting jointly may peti-
tion the state board of conciliation and arbitration to inititate a fact-
finding.2 An employee organization may initiate a fact-finding peti-
tion only if that organization is designated or recognized in accordance 
with G.L., c. 149, §l78H(d) as the exclusive representative of the muni-
cipal employees involved.3 Upon receipt of a petition for fact-finding, 
the board will investigate the situation.4 If it appears that there is 
either an unresolved dispute or a failure on the part of the parties to 
agree, the board will initiate fact-finding.5 
The selection of the person to serve as fact finder is· initiated and 
overseen by the board. The board submits to the parties a list of three 
"qualified, disinterested persons" from which the parties may choose 
one to serve as fact finder. 6 If, having been in receipt of the board's list 
for five days, the parties cannot reach a mutual choice, the. board will 
appoint a fact finder. 7 The person chosen or appointed as fact finder 
§6.7. 1 The administrative caseload resulting from the failure of across-the-table 
bargaining to handle municipal employee disputes is detailed in §6.9 infra. 
2 G.L., c. 149, §178J(a). The information to be included in the petition is set forth in 
Fact Finding Rules no. 2. 
3 This provision is set forth separately in the laws and could be construed to prevent 
employers from initiating fact-finding petitions. The board has understandably not so 
construed it. 
4 G.L., c. 149, §178J(b). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. The person appointed by the board need not be one of the three persons sug-
gested to the parties by the board. 
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is authorized to hold hearings, which are to be conducted in accord-
ance with the regulations of the board, and which are to be held within 
the municipality involved if such is feasible.8 In furtherance of such 
hearings the board may, upon request, issue subpoenas, and the fact 
finder is empowered to take testimony under oath.9 Within 60 days 
after his appointment (unless the period is extended by the board for 
good cause) and after completion of hearings, the fact finder is re-
quired to make written findings of fact and recommendations for the 
resolution of the dispute and to have them served on both parties. 10 
The recommendations are in no way binding upon the parties. 11 The 
cost of the fact-finding is to be divided equally between the two parties 
to the dispute. 12 
When municipal employers and employee organizations are involved 
in contract disputes, i.e., disputes over the terms of a new contract, the 
services of the state board of conciliation and arbitration are available 
for the purpose of conciliation. 13 The conciliation procedure as set 
out in G.L., c. 150, §314 provides that the board, having received 
notice of a dispute, shall endeavor to settle it by mediating between 
the parties or shall try to persuade them to submit the dispute to arbi-
tration. If both of these attempts fail, the board is to investigate the 
cause of the controversy to ascertain which of the parties is mainly 
responsible or blameworthy for the creation or continuance of the dis-
pute. Unless settlement is reached, the board is to publish a report 
finding the cause of the controversy and assigning responsibility for 
its continuance. 15 Thus conciliation is a nonbinding procedure 
whereby one party is singled out as being in the wrong in hopes of 
putting sufficient pressure on that party to cause it to settle the dis-
pute. 
While either a fact-finding or conciliation is being attempted, the 
fact finder or the conciliator will often resort to medition, a process 
which is occasionally referred to in the statutes but not explained in 
any detail. Section 178 of Chapter 149 provides: "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to prohibit the fact finder from endeavoring to 




11 There is nothing in the statute which makes them binding. 
12 G.L., c. 149, §178J(e). 
13 I d.§ 178K. 
14 Section 3 does not by its terms include municipal employers. Presumably the later 
statute (G.L., c. 149, §178K) will be construed as overruling Section 3 by implication, so 
as to permit the conciliation of municipal employer disputes. 
15 G.L., c. 150, §3. In substance, the "place blame" procedure is no different from the 
commission's prohibited practice procedure. Although the prohibited practice remedy 
(a cease and desist order, plus assessment of the costs of the procedure to the violating 
party) would seem to be more efficacious than merely placing blame, in reality that 
remedy carries no requirement for the violating party to make any concessions, and the 
commission almost never assesses costs to a party found responsible for a failure to bar-
gain in good faith. 
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mediate the dispute in which he has been selected or appointed as a 
fact finder." 16 Mediation is also described as a preliminary step to 
conciliationP Mediation is an informal procedure conducted be-
fore and during the statutory procedures in an attempt to resolve the 
controversy by persuading the parties to settle their dispute. 
If no collective bargaining agreement is reached, either with or with-
out the aid of fact-finding, mediation, or conciliation, there are no 
provisions in the statute for arriving at an effective contract between 
the parties. The municipal employer and the employee organization 
are left to their own devices to reach an agreement. Because there is no 
right to strike, the parties are urged toward settlement only by their 
own needs for stable labor relations. In at least one case where the 
municipal employer and the employee organization were unable to 
agree to a contract, they voluntarily agreed to submit their contract 
di_¢ute to the arbitration board. The board made an award in the 
0~e_, 18 and the parties agreed to adopt the award as the contract. 19 
§6.8. Collective bargaining agreements between municipal em-
ployers and employee organizations. Collective bargaining agree-
ments between municipal employers and employee organizations have 
a status that is not comparable to the status of a collective bargaining 
agreement in the private sector. The municipal employer, being a polit-
ical subdivision of the state, does not have the legislative power to 
appropriate funds and may not make a private contract that conflicts 
with legislative enactments. 1 In most respects a collective bargaining 
agreement between a municipal employer and an employee organiza-
tion is enforceable by both parties.2 The special character of municipal 
employee contracts has given rise to explicit qualifications with re-
spect to the relationship between municipal collective bargaining 
agreements and public law: (I) if the terms of the contract conflict with 
any law, ordinance, or bylaw, the conflicting portion of the employee 
contract cannot prevail;3 (2) if the terms of the contract conflict with 
16 G.L.,c.149,§178J(f). 
17 G.L., c. 150, §3. 
18 Award of Arbitrators in the Matter of the Arbitration Between Boston Teachers 
Union, Local 66, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO and Boston School Com-
mittee, Aug. 4, 1970. 
19 Settlement Agreement, School Committee of the City of Boston and the Boston 
Teachers Union, Local 66, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Aug. II, 1970. 
§6.8. 1 Indeed the common law theories of sovereignty (that governmental power 
resides ultimately in the populace and cannot be infringed upon) and delegation of 
powers (the legislature cannot delegate its power over the purse and the laws of the state) 
may continue to prevent municipal collective bargaining entirely where they are ob-
served. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service 38c54 (1961 ). 
2 G.L., c. 149, §1781 (by implication). If a municipal employer agrees to a clause in a 
collective bargaining agreement that calls for arbitration of contract terms, and if a 
dispute arises over a contract term that involves the expenditure of funds not appro-
priated, and arbitration award that would cause the employer to spend funds not 
appropriated, would raise at least some question as to whether the award would be 
binding on the employer. Hart, id. at 38-54. 
3 G.L.,c.l49,§1781. 
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any regulation made by a chief of police pursuant to his authority to 
administer the police department4 or by a head of a fire department 
pursuant to similar authority,5 the contract controls rather than the 
regulations;6 and (3) if money is required for the implementation of 
any provision of the contract and the legislative body concerned fails 
to approve the appropriation necessary to provide the funds, the con-
tract must be returned to the parties for further bargaining.7 
The relationship between a municipal collective bargining agree-
ment and a state law was at issue in Chief of Police v. Town of Dra-
cut. 8 The collective bargaining agreement had been made by the town 
selectmen with the bargaining representative of the police officers and 
by its terms, inter alia, set standards for certain assignments of police 
officers and for the granting of leaves. The police chief contended that 
the selectmen, in agreeing to the provisions of the contract which dealt 
with leaves and the assignment of officers, had exceeded their bargain-
ing authority and had infringed upon the powers granted to the police 
chief under G .L., c. 41, §97 A. Section 97 A provides that the police chief 
shall be in immediate control of his officers, whom he is to assign to 
their duties. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Section 97A gave 
the authority to the chief to assign his men, and that the legislature, in 
enacting provisions for collective bargaining by municipal employees, 
had meant neither to take that authority away from the chief nor to per-
mit the selectmen to bargain it away under the guise of negotiations on 
"wages, hours and other conditions of employment." Since the collec-
tive bargaining agreement conflicted with Section 97A, the agreement 
failed in that respect because Section 1781 of Chapter 149 made the 
existing statute controlling. 
After the lower court decision in the Dracut case, the legislature had 
amended Section 1781 to provide that the terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement would prevail over the regulations made by a police chief 
under Section 97A. The Supreme Judicial Court found that the passage 
of the amendment did not require a different result in Dracut because 
there had been no regulations made by the chief of police that were 
still extant and in conflict with the collective bargaining agreement. 
The Court indicated that the assignments made by the police chief were 
not "regulations" that could conflict with Section 1781.9 
4 G.L., c. 41, §97A, provides the authority of the police chief to regulate his depart-
ment. 
5 G.L., c. 48, §42, provides the authority for the head of a fire department to regulate 
his department. 
6 G.L., c. 149, §178I; the particular provision was added to Section 178I by Acts of 
1969, c. 341, to clarify a previous conflict between that section and Section 97A of Chap-
ter 41. 
7 Ibid. The procedure outlined in the text is not followed in the case of school nego-
tiations in municipalities or towns that have adopted Section 34 of Chapter 71. Under 
Section 34, the right of the school committee to fix the salaries of teachers is absolute. 
Watt v. Town of Chelmsford, 323 Mass. 697, 84 N.E.2d 28 (1949), and cases cited therein. 
8 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 258 N.E.2d 531, discussed in 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law, 
§§ll.5, 24.6, 24.8, 24.12, 24.20. 
9 Id. at 774 n.3, 258 N.E.2dat535 n.3 (by implication). 
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The relationship between a municipal collective bargaining agree-
ment and a city ordinance was explored in Fitchburg Teachers Assn. 
v. School Committee. 1o The school committee and the teachers' asso-
ciation had signed a collective bargaining agreement which provided 
for a salary adjustment for the benefit of retiring teachers, the adjust-
ment to consist of an additional payment in the final year of service. 
The amount of the payment was computed on the basis of the number 
of days of the teacher's attendance in excess of 170 each year, the excess 
days being those designated as unused sick leave or personal leave days. 
When requested by the school committee to make payments pursuant 
to the provision, the auditor of Fitchburg refused. The auditor argued 
that the contract provision conflicted with a city ordinance that for-
bade the payment to any person, either as compensation or as a gift, of 
"any more money than such person has actually earned in such em-
ployment," and that under Section 178I the ordinance was to prevail. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's response focused on the auditor's in-
valid premise, to wit, that the salary adjustment was a gratuity. The 
Court had no trouble finding the contract provision to be a valid exer-
cise of the committee's power to set wages and conditions of employ-
ment through collective bargaining. In finding that the money to be 
paid pursuant to the contract would actually have been earned, the 
Court held that the contract provision did not conflict with the or-
dinance and hence that the agreement could stand. 
It should be mentioned that the status of municipal employee <;:on-
tracts may be affected by Section 178N, which provides: "Nothing in 
sections [178F-178M, which set forth the entire municipal bargaining 
law] shall diminish the authority and power of the civil service com-
mission, or any retirement board or personnel board established by 
law .... " 11 In addition, it should be remembered that municipal 
employee contracts are limited to terms of three years' duration. 12 
When under an existing collective bargaining agreement the parties 
are in conflict over a grievance, the services of the Massachusetts Board 
of Conciliation and Arbitration are available for the conciliation of 
the grievance. 13 If municipal employers and employee organizations 
are involved in disputes over the interpretation or application of the 
terms of a written agreement, the services of the board are available for 
the purpose of arbitration (other arbitration tribunals may be used 
as well for the same purpose as long as the costs thereof are equally 
divided). 14 The arbitration procedure is governed by G.L., c. 150, 
§§5, 6. Section 6 provides that the application to the board must be 
signed by the employer, by a majority of employees concerned with the 
controversy or their duly authorized agent, or by both parties. If the 
application is signed by an agent claiming to represent the employees, 
10 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.l253,271 N.E.2d646. 
II G.L., c. 149, §178N. 
121d. § 1781. 
13 The conciliation procedure is set forth in §6. 7 supra·. 
14 G.L., c.l49, §l78K. 
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the board must satisfy itself that the agent is so authorized but may not 
reveal the names of the authorizing employees. The application must 
contain a concise statement of the controversy, and the parties to the 
application must promise to continue at work without any lockout or 
strike until the decision of the board has been rendered or until three 
weeks have passed after the filing of the application, whichever occurs 
first. After the application has been filed, the board must promptly 
publish notice of a hearing on the application. If both parties have 
joined in the application apd have presented a written request that no 
public notice be given, the board, in its discretion, need not give public 
notice but shall notify the parties. If the party presenting the applica-
tion does not fulfill its promise to continue work, the board may not 
proceed further without the written consent of the adverse party. 
Section 5 provides that if an application has been made to the board 
in accordance with Section 6 and if a controversy exists between an 
employer and his employees, the board must visit the site of the con-
troversy as soon as possible and inquire into the cause of the dispute. 
The board must hear all interested persons who appear before it, ad-
vise the respective parties to the controversy what they ought to do or 
submit to in order to resolve the controversy, and make a written deci-
sion thereof. That decision is binding for six months upon the parties 
who join in the application, unless both parties stipulate in the applica-
tion that the contract is to run for a longer period of time; in the latter 
case the board's decision is binding for the length of time agreed upon 
by the partit~s in their application. Once entered, the decision of the 
board is to be made public immediately and is to be open to public in-
spection. After the decision is recorded by the board, a summary there-
of is filed with the clerk of the municipality involved. 15 The purpose 
of arbitration is to provide a binding procedure whereby the facts of 
a labor controversy are discovered and a fair and impartial solution 
is imposed upon the parties who have petitioned the board. 
The construction of the arbitration statutes and of a collective bar-
gaining agreement between a school committee and a teachers' union 
was involved in Sheahan v. School Committee of Worcester. 16 The per-
tinent section of the collective bargaining agreement read as follows: 
In the event that the employee alleging a grievance is not satis-
fied with the decision of the School Committee, the Association 
may file at the request of the employee an application with the 
State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration for further review 
under the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the General Laws, 
Chapter 150. The School Committee reserves the right to insist 
upon a court determination of the jurisdiction of the arbitratorY 
An application was initiated by the association, and an award was made 
15 A summary may also be published in the Annual Report of the Massachusetts 
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration. G.L., c. 150, §5. 
16 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.I073,270N.E.2d912. 
17 I d. at 1074,270 N .E.2d at 913. 
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in favor of the association by the board. The school committee moved 
to vacate and dismiss the board's award, arguing in part that the board 
lacked jurisdiction because the committee had never agreed to arbi-
trate the controversy. 
The Supreme Judicial Court indicated initially that an agreement 
between a municipal employer and an employee organization to sub-
mit an existing or future controversy to arbitration was "valid, enforce-
able and irrevocable," and subject to interpretation and enforcement 
under the provisions of Chapter 150C of the General Laws. 18 The 
Court then turned its attention to Sections 5 and 6 of Chapter 150, 
which were specified in the collective bargaining agreement as con-
trolling the "review." Concentrating on the first two sentences of Sec-
tion 5 ("If a controversy exists ... the board shall ... visit the 
place ... [and] shall hear all persons interested ... , advise the 
respective parties what ought to be done ... , and make a written de-
cision thereof .... "), the Court stated: 
That language when read alone comtemplates and permits ac-
tion by the board in the form of recommendations or advice to the 
parties, and does not limit the board's action to a binding decision. 
This conclusion seems compelled when the quoted language is 
read with (a) the provision of §6 permitting an application to be 
filed with the board on the signature of either or both parties to 
a controversy, and ·(b) the provision of §5 that the board's "deci-
sion shall for six months be binding upon the parties who join in 
said application," or longer if the parties agree. Neither §5 nor 
§6 contains the word "arbitration."19 
In construing the language of the grievance clause of the collective 
bargaining agreement, the Court said: 
The language of the collective bargaining agreement was se-
lected by the parties. They said that the Association could ask the 
board to "review" a controversy under §§5 and 6, rather than to 
"arbitrate" the controversy. The language of the agreement is not 
ambiguous. 20 
18 ld. at 1076, 270 N.E.2d at 914 (by implication). An examination of G.L., c. !SOC, 
§I, suggests that if the Court were to consider the question directly, it would hold that 
Chapter !SOC applies to collective bargaining agreements between municipal employers 
and employee organizations. Section 1 of that chapter provides in part: "[A] provision 
in a written agreement between a labor organization or organizations, as defined in 
[G.L., c. ISOA, §2(S)] and an employer ... to submit to arbitration any existing con-
troversy or any controversy thereafter arising . . . shall be valid, enforceable and· ir-
revocable .... " Employee as defined in Chapter ISOA includes any employee, but 
employer as defined in the same chapter does not include a political subdivision. G.L., 
c. ISOA, §2(2), (3). However, the use of employer in Chapter !SOC does not seem to re-
quire any reference to the definition of employer in Chapter ISOA. It is therefore sub-
mitted that Chapter !SOC does apply to collective bargaining agreements involving a 
municipal employer. 
19 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1073,1077, 270N.E.2d912, 91S. 
20 Ibid. 
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The Court held that the language in the grievance clause of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement did not constitute a prior agreement by the 
committee that it would submit any controversy to the board for arbi-
tration. 
The Court's decision in Sheahan is in part the result of its unjusti-
fiably restrictive approach to the arbitration provisions of Chapter 150. 
The problem is that the Court chose to construe the first two sentences 
of Section 5 alone. Section 5 does not contemplate by its terms a non-
binding decision. The board is required by the statute to issue a written 
decision, and the statute clearly states: "Said decision shall for six 
months be binding upon the parties who join in said application." 
(Emphasis added.)21 If only one person has petitioned the board, 
that person is bound by the board's decision in accordance with the 
statute. The fact that the nonjoining party to the controversy is not 
bound by the award may make the decision effectively nonbinding on 
the petitioner if the latter's obligation is conditioned upon perfor-
mance by the nonjoining party pursuant to the award. In that case, 
however, the nonbinding effect would not depend on the language of 
the arbitration statute. The Court's reading of Section 5 in Sheahan 
seems incorrect precisely because it reads into that section a nonbind-
ing procedure that is without basis in the statutory language. 
The Sheahan decision also reflected in part an unjustifiably restric-
tive approach to the construction of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The Court clearly hinged its decision upon the use of the word 
review in the agreement and indicated that the parties ought to have 
used arbitrate instead. Yet, as the Court itself pointed out, the word 
arbitrate is not used in the statute-not in Section 5, 6, or any other 
section of Chapter 150 that refers to the proceeding under Section 5. 
The word occurs only in the titles of Sections 5 ("Arbitration") and 6 
("Application for Arbitration"). Since the statute itself does not use 
the word arbitration to describe the binding procedure set forth in Sec-
tion 5, it seems particularly inappropriate to fault the parties for using 
the word review, provided they made it clear that the procedure of 
Section 5 was to be followed. 
As a practical matter, there are strong indications that the parties in-
tended to agree upon the use of the binding procedure described in 
Section 5. The Board of Conciliation and Arbitration does not accept 
one-party applications for the Section 5 procedure, even if the other 
party is committed to arbitration by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.22 Therefore, the nonbinding Section 5 procedure described by 
the Court is not even permitted by the board. Other nonbinding pro-
cedures, such as conciliation, are available to the parties if they desire, 
and are measurably superior to the claimed nonbinding Section 5 pro-
cedure since, in the case of conciliation, blame for the dispute is 
affixed and publicly proclaimed. Finally, it seems that if a nonbinding, 
21 G.L., c. 150, §5. 
22 Interview with Conciliator Robert A. Browning, Massachusetts Board of Concilia-
tion and Arbitration, Jan. 5, 1972. 
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one-party procedure can be initiated, there would be no need for the 
parties to bargain over the inclusion in their agreement of a clause 
permitting employees to initiate the procedure. Such a bargaining 
exercise would be meaningless if the procedure could be initiated as 
a matter of statutory right. The Court's interpretation of the agree-
ment seems to run contrary to common sense. After Sheahan, any party 
wishing to provide for arbitration in a collective bargaining agreement 
must do so in unmistakably clear terms and by specific reference to 
arbitration; mere reference to Section 5 of Chapter 150 is insufficient. 
§6.9. Administrative caseload with respect to municipal employees. 
A review of the records of the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commis-
sion shows that in recent years the cases involving municipal employ-
ees have far outnumbered the cases involving other employees. 1 In the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, there were 129 representation cases 
filed by unions representing municipal workers, 114 formal hearings, 
and 88 elections, involving 6573 employees. 2 There were also 18 repre-
sentation petitions filed by employees of state agencies, 17 formal hear-
ings, and three elections, involving 692 employees. In the private sector 
during the same period, only 34 representation petitions were filed, 27 
formal hearings held, and 18 elections conducted, involving 2055 em-
ployees. In the 88 municipal elections ordered and held by the com-
mission (including eight consent elections), 84 unions were certified: 
AFL-CIO unions in 51 cases and independent unions in 33 cases. In the 
same period, municipal employers filed 6 representation petitions upon 
which formal hearings were held; in the 6 resulting elections, the 
unions won 5 and lost I. Out of a total of 22 petitions for amendments 
for clarification of bargaining units, public employees of cities or 
towns were involved in 19 instances. 
In the fiscal year 1970, unions representing 13,000 municipal em-
ployees filed 80 unfair labor practice complaints against municipal 
employers. The commission held 45 informal conferences, issued 7 
complaints, held 16 formal hearings, sustained 1 complaint, and dis-
missed the 6 others. Although 36 complaints had been withdrawn 
and/or dismissed, 35 complaints were still being processed at the end 
of the year. Fire fighters, police, and teachers or other school employ-
ees were involved in 52 of the 80 complaints filed. During the same 
period, 8 complaints were filed against labor unions by individuals or 
municipal employers; 8 informal conferences were held, 4 cases were 
§6.9. 1 The figures summarized in the first two paragraphs of the text were taken 
from Mass. Labor Relations Commn., Report of the Activities of the Labor Relations 
Commission of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1969-
June 30, 1970. 
2 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, the commission received 125 certification 
petitions in the municipal field from employee organizations. (Policemen, firemen, 
public works employees, school custodians, school clericals and schoolteachers accounted 
for most of the 125 cases.) The commission held 77 formal hearings and 92 elections, in-
cluding 37 by consent; 83 elections resulted in certification by unions (47 AFL-CIO and 
36 independents); Mass. Labor Relations COmmn., Preliminary Report of the Activities 
of the Labor Relations Commission for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1971. 
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withdrawn and/or dismissed, and 4 were still being processed at the 
end of the year. 
In the fiscal. year ending June 30, 1971, the Massachusetts Board of 
Conciliation and Arbitration also handled more municipal conciliation 
cases than private sector cases. 3 It received 240 cases involving munici-
pal conciliation (compared with 217 in other fields), closed 109 by 
conciliation, transferred 5 to labor relations, and transferred 93 to fact 
finders. At the end of the year, 46 cases were pending, compared with 
13 cases pending at the end of the previous year. These figures are 
nearly double the number of cases involving municipal employees in 
fiscal 1970.4 • 
Of the 93 cases referred to fact finders after the failure of conciliation 
efforts by the board during 1971, 21 cases were settled by the fact finder 
and 38 cases were reported upon by the fact finder. 5 One case was with-
drawn after the appointment of the fact finder and one was transferred 
to arbitration. At the end of the year, 43 cases were still pending, com-
pared with only 11 at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
§6.10. Conclusion. Massachusetts municipal bargaining laws, in 
the six years since their enactment, have not been able to provide the 
needed foundation for stable municipal employee relations. The statute 
itself is incomplete, subject to conflicting interpretations, and not in-
tegrated at all with the arbitration and conciliation statutes (which 
themselves are substantially unchanged since they were enacted in 
1886). 1 The regulations issued by the Massachusetts Labor Relations 
Commission are likewise incomplete and subject to conflicting inter-
pretations. The commission is flooded with cases involving municipal 
employment, and its work is being greatly delayed as a result. The 
municipal conciliation load at the Board of Conciliation and Arbi-
tration is likewise soaring, and the number of fact-finding cases an-
nually is exceeding 100.2 Under the present collective bargaining law, 
those procedures which relate to the solution of disputes involving new 
contracts are being subjected to severe tests, in part because of the ten-
dency of municipal employers to ignore any fact-findings which in-
volve expenditure of tax monies. 
The commission is under attack from critics who question both its 
policies and procedures.3 Employee organizations are becoming more 
'The figures summarized in the final two paragraphs of the text were taken from 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Annual Report of the Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration for Fiscal Year of July I, 1970-June 30, 1971. 
4 See Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Annual Report of the Board of Conciliation 
and Arbitration for Fiscal Year of July I, 1969-June 30, 1970. 
5 No records were available on the results of the fact finders' reports in these 38 cases. 
Casual observation seems to indicate a growing tendency on the part of the municipal 
employer to reject the fact finder's recommendations in whole or in part. 
§6.10. 1 The arbitration statute was enacted as Acts of 1886, c. 263, §§3-6. The con-
ciliation statute was enacted as Acts of 1887, c. 269, §§4, 5. 
2 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Annual Report of the Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration for Fiscal Year of July I, 1970-June 30, 1971. 
'E.g., Boston Globe, Dec. 5, 1969, at 24. 
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dissatisfied with the present law and its administration. For example, 
at the recent convention of the Massachusetts State Labor Council, 
AFL-CIO, the following resolutions were adopted: (l) support legis-
lation giving public employees the right to strike;4 (2) support legis-
lation providing for compulsory arbitration for fire fighters (who have 
been unable to convince municipal employers to accept the recommen-
dations of fact finders in Springfield, Boston, and Fall River);5 (3) 
support legislation to make the three-judge, anti-injunction law appli-
cable to public employment;6 (4) call for additional personnel at the 
commission and the establishment of an office in the western part of 
the state;7 and (5) repeal the 1875 statute8 that sets a school budget 
date of September 1 and thereby limits the period available for collec-
tive bargaining.9 Another resolution called for the creation of a new 
labor relations commission to handle only municipal employee cases 
because "delays have occurred before the State Labor Relations Com-
mission due to the laxity of keeping up with the change of times and 
labor disputes. "to 
Other proposals for change have not been lacking. In its second 
iterim report, the Special Legislative Study Commission on Collective 
Bargaining called for the creation of a new Public Employee Relations 
Commission which, although intended principally for state employ-
ees, might later be adapted to meet the needs of the counties and muni-
cipalities.11 Another proposal would nationalize public sector bar-
gaining and eliminate state bargaining schemes. 12 The proposal 
would establish a Federal Public Employee Mediation Board to have 
jurisdiction over all government employees, and would provide for 
appointment of public mediators who would have power to require 
acceptance of the proposal of either of the disputing parties on a par-
ticular issue. To assist the local legislatures in meeting the monetary 
awards of the mediators, the federal government would contribute up 
to 20 percent of cost increases of any resulting contracts. Public em-
4 Massachusetts State Labor Council, AFL-CIO, Resolutions Before the Fourteenth 
Convention, Oct. 5, 1971 (Resolution No. 36). [hereinafter cited as Labor Council Resolu-
tions]. 
5 Id. (No. 58). The pattern of compulsory arbitration is inconsistent. At the present 
time, compulsory arbitration applies to nurses in privately owned health care facilities 
(G.L., c. 150A, §9A) but does not apply to nurses employed in municipally owned health 
care facilities as the latter are subject only to nonbinding fact-finding G.L., c. 149, 
§§178G-178N). 
6 Labor Council Resolutions (No. 34). 
7 Id. (No. 27). 
8 Acts of 1875, §241, as most recently amended by Acts of 1963, §786 (a special act). 
9 Labor Council Resolutions (No. 32). 
10 Id. (No. 27). 
11 House Bill 5235, Appendix B. It is interesting to note that this report also recom· 
mends for state employees many of the provisions now covering municipal employees. 
Included among the recommended provisions are some which have been under attack in 
the municipal field, such as the provision for nonbinding fact-finding. 
12 Lev, Strikes by Government Employees: Problems and Solutions, 57 A.B.A.]. 771 
(1971). 
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ployees would still not have the right to strike, however, even where 
the locality refused to accept the mediator's award. 
The proposals noted above, however, would not solve all the prob-
lems of bargaining in the public sector. One of the most difficult prob-
lems involved in municipal collective bargaining is the quality of the 
bargaining on both sides. Instances of inexperience and lack of mature 
leadership on the part of employer and employee alike will continue 
to produce unnecessary tensions and labor unrest in Massachusetts. 
To implement the present law, there is a neep for trained and experi-
enced personnel administrators. More extensive use of qualified per-
sons in handling grievances and negotiations will help to avoid a 
backlog of unresolved grievances and promote industrial peace in the 
public sector. The development within public agencies of skilled man-
agement that is concerned with maintaining healthy relationships with 
its employees and with implementing aggressive ideas to reduce labor 
costs will contribute to the reduction of public employee disputes. A 
willingness on the part of management and labor alike to entrust their 
qualified negotiators with authority commensurate with their function 
will also produce better labor relations. 
In addition, the general public will have to be educated to under-
stand fully the economics of the public sector. Adequate funds will 
have to be raised if public services are to be continually expanded and 
if the legitimate needs of the public employee are to be satisfied. Public 
services must be delivered more effectively and efficiently, and consumer 
support must be generated. As part of a philosophy of constructive 
collective bargaining, there must be developed an identity of interests 
between management and labor in the public sector similar to the 
identity of interests developed in many parts of the private sector. 
There are other areas of uncertainty under the Massachusetts law 
that will have to be clarified: ( 1) the relation of the collective bargain-
ing contract (especially the union security and agency fee provisions) 
to employee rights under civil service, tenure, retirement, and person-
nel laws and regulations; (2) the relation of the collective bargaining 
process to the budget-making process and to the school laws; (3) the 
role of supervisors and their proper place in the appropriate bargain-
ing unit; (4) the scope of bargaining and the meaning of "wages, hours 
and other conditions of employment" in the public field; and (5) the 
means of enforcement of the collective bargaining contract. More com-
prehensive regulations on the part of the commission could go a long 
way toward eliminating some of these areas of uncertainty. 
To date, the public has been concerned with symptoms and crises 
rather than with the improvement of methods necessary to achieve 
equitable and peaceful settlements in the public sector. In the private 
sector, our labor law system ~ncourages collective bargaining as an 
instrument of industrial peace. Although collective bargaining is not 
a perfect instrument for resolving conflicts over wages and working 
conditions, it has helped to resolve problems, has fostered a climate 
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conducive to negotiations between labor and management, and has 
narrowed the range of differences between employers and employees 
so as to permit temporary accommodations or long-term solutions. 
The philosophy and practice of bilateralism with respect to issues 
arising from the employment relationship in the private sector must 
be adapted to the public sector to provide greater participatory rights, 
including collective bargaining, for state and local government em-
ployees. Unless satisfactory solutions are developed for some of the 
above major problems, municipal bargaining will soon face further 
serious challenges in Massachusetts. 
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